

Monday, July 24. 1716.

Venerable arrived the Mail from Holland of Tuesday

H 26 U 2, July 25.

**T**HE French Plenipotentiaries are gone from Gertruydenberg. Before their Departure they wrote a farewell Letter to M. Buys and van der Dussen, in a Style much more moderate and complaisant than that they us'd to the great Pensionary in their Letter of the 20th Instant: For they tell the Deputies, "That they are sorry the Conferences had not Succeed; express themselves oblig'd to them for all their Civilities; and conclude, that since the Conferences were broken off they were going away, but should gladly embrace all Occasions of doing them Service." The States General having resolv'd the 23d, that some Answer should be made to the 11th Letter of the 20th from those Plenipotentiaries to the great Pensionary, the Deputies for foreign Affairs drew up an Answer accordingly; wherein they studied to shew an equal Mixture of Decency Temper and Freedom, which ever sets forth Truth and Reason in their best Light and Force. On Sunday the 27th, the Ministers of the Allies were all invited to the *Troes Kamer*, which is an Apartment of the Court here wherein Congresses are ordinarily held; and the Draught of the Answer being read to them, they were severally ask'd their Advice upon it, principally, whether they judg'd any thing superfluous or deficient: But they unanimously approv'd the whole, without any Alteration; and thereupon the States pass'd it into a Resolution in Form. The following Pieces were thereupon given to the States Printer, and being work'd off Yesterday, Copies of them were distributed to every Minister.

The Letter from the French Ministers to the great Pensionary, dated from Gertruydenberg the 20th of July 1716.

**Y**OU know we agreed to all that Messieurs the Deputies had propos'd to us, and none can say we have varied upon any Point whatsoever, much less that we have retracted the Offers we had made by Order of the King our Master, with Intention to procure Peace, to be necessary to all Europe.

Messieurs the Deputies have taken the Matter otherwise. You have not forgotten what has pass'd between them and us from the beginning of the Negotiation: Give us Leave, Sir, to lay before you the Propositions newly invented, unjust, and impossible to be executed, which those Gentlemen, for a final Answer to ours, made to us in the last Conference. They told us,

That the Resolution of their Masters and their Allies was to reject absolutely all Offers of Money on the Part of the King to help them to maintain the War in Spain, whatever might be the Sum, and whatever Security his Majesty would give for the Payment.

That the State and its Allies would oblige the King our Master, to make War singly against the King his Grandson, to compel him to renounce his Crown, and that without uniting their Forces to those of his Majesty, they would have that Monarch dispossess'd of Spain and the Indies, within the Term of 2 Months.

That this Term expiring, without the Catholic King's being actually driven from the Throne, the Truce to be between the Allies and the King our Master, should cease; and that they would refuse their Arms against his Majesty, though he should have perform'd all the other Conditions contain'd in the Preliminary Articles.

That before the signing of those Preliminaries they were willing, provided the King would enter into the Engagement above mention'd, to explain themselves positively as to the Partition which they would consent to leave to the King of Spain; and that they would likewise facilitate an Agreement upon their further Demands.

Lastly, That they might be willing to permit, as a Favour, that the Troops they have in Portugal and Spain, might act jointly with those of France, during the Space of 2 Months, to facilitate the Conquest of Spain and the Indies, which his Majesty should be oblig'd to make in favour of the Archduke; but that immediately upon the Expiration of that Term, those Troops of the Allies should cease so to act, and that the Truce should break off.

We represented to Messieurs the Deputies, that these Propositions were contradictory, as well to those they had all along made to us, as to the 24th and 25th Articles of the Preliminaries, whereto the 37th Article, which 'twas our Business to regulate, related: The Tenour of those three Articles being to prescribe the Manner of putting the Allies into full Possession of Spain, and the Indies.

They answer'd, That the Concession of a Partition, which in good time they would specify, and which they

(Price Two Pence.)

have not yet declar'd, gave them a Right to insist now upon more than the 24th and 25th Articles import.

In Reply to this, we urg'd an unanswerable Argument; by demanding of them, whether in all our Conferences, a Partition had not been talk'd of? And whether upon that Foundation, they had ever requir'd any thing else of us, than the taking of Measures by Concert and the acting with united Forces?

Messieurs the Deputies did not deny it, for they could not deny it; but they said, that if they had propos'd the taking of Measures by Concert and the acting with united Forces, they would not abide by it; having Order to declare in the Name of the Allies, and to tell us, that in a Word their Determination was, Whether the Partition were excepted, or whether it were not, to receive from the Hands of the King our Master the Monarchy of Spain and the Indies, leaving to him simply the Care of employing such Means, either of Persuasion or of Compulsion, as he should judge most effectual, to put the Archduke into actual Possession of his Dominions within the Space of 2 Months.

So formal a disclaiming of all the past Proceedings, and of all the Demands made on the Part of the Allies; as also the rejecting whatever was possible to be done on our Part; sufficiently betray, Sir, a formal Design to break off all Negotiation.

'Twas needless to allow us the Term of fifteen Days, for our procuring the Answer of the King our Master to these Demands, altogether new, and till now unheard of, the Performance of which is out of his Power.

His Majesty has long since intimated, That for the Sake of a definitive and secure Peace, he would yield to such Conditions as he himself could execute; but he will never promise what he knows impossible for him to perform. If by the Injustice and Obstinacy of his Enemies he be depriv'd of all Hope of obtaining Peace; then, trusting in the Protection of God, who is able when he pleases to humble those whom unhop'd for Prosperity elevates; and who make no Account of the publick Calamities and the Effusion of Christian Blood, he will leave it to the Judgment of all Europe, even to the Judgment of the People of England and of Holland, to distinguish who are the true Authors of the Continuance of so bloody a War.

On one Hand they will see the Advances which the King our Master has made, the Consent he has given to the hardest Propositions, and the Engagements into which his Majesty yielded to enter, for taking away all Diffidence and forwarding the Peace. On the other Hand they may observe a continual Affectation to fresh oblige, that there might be always room to form Pretensions beyond the Conditions agreed; inasmuch that we had no sooner yielded to one Demand, and such as seem'd to be the utmost that could be ask'd, but 'twas relinquish'd to substitute another more exorbitant in its place.

And they will likewise perceive a Variation, solely regulated either by the Events of War, or by the Facilities which the King our Master shew'd for Peace. It appears by the Letters written to us by Messieurs the Deputies, that they themselves do not deny this.

Last Year the Dutch and their Allies look'd upon it as an Injury, for Men to think them capable of demanding of the King to unite his Forces to those of the Confederacy, to oblige the King his Grandson to quit his Crown: They appeal'd even to the Preliminaries, which speak only of asking Measures by Concert: They have since made no Difficulty to insist peremptorily upon it.

They would now have his Majesty undertake it singly; and they have the Assurance to say, that if they would have formerly contented themselves with less, their Interest (which they now better understand) induces them not to be content with it any longer. Such a Declaration, Sir, is a formal Rupture of all Negotiation; and 'tis that the Chief of the Allies wish for.

Should we continue longer at Gertruydenberg, should we pass whole Years in Holland, our Stay would be useless, seeing those who govern the State are perswaded, that 'tis their Interest to make the Peace depend upon an impossible Condition. We do not offer to persuade them to prolong a Negotiation which they have a Mind to break; and in short whatever Desire the King our Master has to procure Quiet to his People, it will be less grievous to them to support the War, an End of which they know his Majesty would purchase by so great Sacrifices, against the same Enemies with whom he has been fighting these Ten Years; than to have him add the King his Grandson to those Enemies, and imprudently undertake to conquer Spain and the Indies in Two Months, in a certain Assurance, when that Term is expired, to find his Enemies strengthen'd by the Places he must yield to them; and by Conse-

quences



justice in a Condition to turn against himself the new Force he should put into their Hands.

This, Sir, is the positive Answer which the King has order'd us to make to you upon the new Propositions of Messieurs the Deputies. We do it at the End of 6 Days instead of 15, which they had allowed us as a Favour. This Dispatch may serve at least to satisfy you, that we do not seek to amuse you, and that if we have frequently desir'd Conferences, 'twas not to multiply them to no Purpose, but to omit nothing that might conduce to Peace.

We pass over in Silence the Proceedings towards us in Contempt of our Character. We say nothing to you of the injurious Libels full of Falshood and Calumny, which have been suffer'd to be printed and dispers'd during our Stay, with Design to inflame against us the Minds of those with whom we were labouring to beget a Reconciliation. We do not even complain that in Breach of the publick Faith, and in Scorn of our so oft-repeated Remonstrances, all the Letters which we have receiv'd or writren have been open'd: From which however this Advantage results to us, that the Pretext made use of to palliate those Indignities was discover'd to be ill-grounded. None can reproach us with having attempted any of the least Practices contrary to the Rights of Nations, which were violated towards us. And 'tis palpable, that by hindring any from making Visits to us in our kind of Prison, the thing most fear'd and sought to be prevented was, our discovering such Truths as were industriously kept conceal'd.

We desire you will please, Sir, to return an Answer by our Express whom we have order'd to wait for it; or if you will not answer, to give him a Certificate of your Receipt of this Letter. We are most sincerely,

Sir,

Your most humble and most obedient Servants,

*Huicellor, The Abbot de Polignac.*

*An Extrall from the Register of the Resolutions of their High Mightinesses the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands.*

*On Wednesday the 23d of July, 1710. at Half an Hour past Six a Clock in the Evening.*

**M** de Randwijck and other Deputies of their High Mightinesses for foreign Affairs, reported to the Assembly, that the Councillor Pensionary M. Heinsius, had communicated to them a Letter of M. the Marshal de Uxelles and the Abbot de Polignac, Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the King of France, written to him the Councillor Pensionary from Gertruydenberg the 20th of this Month, as an Answer to what had been propos'd to them in the last Conference by the Deputies M. Buys and vander Dussen, and upon which they had debated: That they the said Deputies for Foreign Affairs had judg'd the Contents of that Letter, to be of such a Nature, as to concern not only the State, but likewise all the Allies; and therefore held it their Duty to communicate it to their Ministers residing here, to the End that every thing hitherto having been done in Concert with them, the like Rule might be observ'd in this Affair. And that the said Ministers, as well as they the Deputies were of Opinion, that the said Plenipotentiaries, rejecting by their said Answer the Propositions made to them, declaring that 'twas useless to hold any more Conferences upon those Propositions, and thereby breaking off the Negotiations on that Subject, nothing more remain'd to be done on the Part of the high Allies, than to acquiesce therewith, and so enter into no more Conferences as long as the Enemy shall continue in such Sentiments, because while they are in this Temper further Conferences could produce no good Effect, but would only create Animosities, instead of disposing and forwarding things towards Peace, which the State and its Allies have always sought.

Upon which their High Mightinesses having deliberated, approve and agree to the Opinion as well of the Deputies as of the Ministers of the high Allies; and have also thought fit and resolv'd, that the Deputies M. Buys and vander Dussen, shall be requir'd and authoriz'd, as they are by these Presents, to signify it by a Letter to the said Plenipotentiaries, without entering into a Debate upon the Contents of the Letter above-mention'd, notwithstanding it might with much Facility and Reason be refus'd, as well with respect to Things as Words.

That besides, a Copy of the said Letter shall be put into the Hands of the said M. de Randwijck, and other Deputies of their High Mightinesses for foreign Affairs, that they may concert with the said Ministers what is proper to be done further, conclude thereupon with them, and make a Report of the whole here to this Assembly.

*[This agrees with the Register.]*

*F. Engel.*

*The Resolution of their High Mightinesses the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands.*

*Pass'd on Sunday the 27th of July 1710. Copied from their Register.*

**M** de Randwijck and other Deputies of their High Mightinesses for foreign Affairs, having by Virtue of their Commisorial Resolution of the 23d Instant, and to acquit themselves of the Duty therein precrib'd them, conferr'd with the Ministers of the High Allies, upon the Letter of M. the Marshal d'Uxelles and the Abbot de Polignac, written to the Councillor Pensionary Heinsius, and dated from Gertruydenberg the 20th past, being in Answer to what had been propos'd to them in the last Conference, by the Deputies M. Buys and vander Dussen, and which was the Subject of that Conference. And having consulted together what might be proper to do and to resolve thereupon; reported to the Assembly, That the said Ministers, jointly with them the Deputies, had unanimously express'd a deep Concern to see that the Enemy, by breaking off the Negotiations which had been resum'd in order to attain a good and general Peace, had dissipated the Hopes that were entertain'd from those Negotiations, and put back the Peace which was so earnestly wish'd for on the Part of the Allies: But having consider'd that Peace cannot be made unless the Enemy are willing, and it appearing clearly that such Willingness it is distant from their Thoughts, as in specious Words 'tis present in their Mouths, nothing remains for the State and their High Allies to do but to acquiesce, tho' with Regret, with this Rupture, and to satisfy their own Minds with the firm Perswasion they are in, that their Intentions to settle Peace upon solid and equitable Foundations, were sincere; and that having ardently desir'd to attain thereto, had the thing been possible, no impartial and equirable Person can impute to them the Rupture of the Negotiations and the Continuance of the War: For tho' the abovesaid Letter abound in reproachful Accusations, and odious Expressions, and endeavours to fasten upon the high Allies the Dissolution of the Conference and the Prolongation of the War, as if they demanded things new, unjust, and impossible to be executed; the Truth of Fact remains ever the same, and shows clearly, that the Fault lies wholly in the Enemy, who have departed from the Foundation on which the Negotiation was begun, and study Pretences to blude the Execution of the capital Point, that is to say the Restitution of Spain and the Indies.

To prove this evidently, let it be consider'd; that for a long time while the Enemy were desiring to enter into some Conference, and into a Negotiation for Peace, the Allies neither would nor could consent to it, unless for a Foundation certain Points were agreed, upon which the Work of the Negotiation might be built and upheld for obtaining a good and general Peace; among which Points the first and principal was, Restitution of Spain and the Indies to King Charles the 3d; which was granted by France, even before the coming of M. Rouillé and the Marquis de Torcy into this Country, and consequently before the Conclusion of the Preliminary Articles by which that Restitution is confirm'd more at large, and stipulated and promis'd anew: And therefore no Person can think it strange, that the high Allies insist upon so capital a Point as that which was the Cause of their entering into the War, and for which it has lasted so long a Time; nor that the said Allies require intire Security upon a Point of so great Importance.

The said Allies judging that Security was no otherwise to be had than by the 37th Article of the Preliminaries, and his Majesty the most Christian King having not thought fit to approve the said Preliminaries, because of the said 37th Article; therefore that Article came to be the Subject of the Negotiation which the Enemy have now broken off, and which was set on Foot for the finding out some Equivalent, by which the same Security might be given to the Allies as they had by the said 37th Article of the Preliminaries. In the first Conference held upon this Subject at Gertruydenberg between the Marshal d'Uxelles and the Abbot de Polignac on the one Part, and M. Buys and vander Dussen on the other; these latter having represented, That the Propositions which eill then had been made, to give to the Allies cautionary Towns in the Netherlands, to serve in Lieu of the Security which they suppos'd they had by the 37th Article of the Preliminaries, could not be accepted, because the Allies would be thereby engag'd in a separate and uncertain War against Spain, while France would enjoy Peace; and that it could not reasonably be requir'd of the Allies, that they should continue in a War lyable to all kinds of Accidents, and wherein they should even run the Risque of never recovering Spain and the Indies; but that 'twas necessary the Peace should be general; the Plenipotentiaries of France appear'd so well perswaded of it, that in that first Conference, and in the others next following it, they propos'd, That since they saw the Allies would be satisfied with no other than a general Peace, with the Restitution of Spain





Spain and the Indies of which King Philip continued possess'd, there were but two Ways to reduce him to relinquish them, the one that of Compulsion, the other, that of Persuasion; the first, they said, would be hard to France, and the last would not be practicable, unless some Portion of the Spanish Monarchy might be put into their Hands, by Means of which the said King might be induc'd to give up the rest; and thereupon having demanded, whether for the procuring a general Peace, the Allies might not hearken to a Partition, they propos'd several Alternatives, one of which being agreed, the Monarchy of Spain, deducting from it the Portion to be left to King Philip, should be transferr'd to King Charles. After divers Conferences, the Plenipotentiaries of France reduc'd at last the said Alternatives to Sicily and Sardinia; which on the Part of the high Allies neither could nor ought to be understood otherwise, than that those two Kingdoms being left to the Grandson of his most Christian Majesty, he should be thereby perswaded by France, to restore to the high Allies the rest of the Monarchy of Spain of which he was still in Possession: But the high Allies discovering, from what pass'd in the last Conference but one, and by the Reports of the Deputies, that if the high Allies should prevail with themselves to accept the Proposition which had been made for obtaining a general Peace, it would remain uncertain whether they should thereby acquire a general Peace, because the said Plenipotentiaries of France did not explain themselves clearly, whether in such a Case Spain and the Indies would be put into the Hands of King Charles, conformably to the Preliminaries; and even because they appear'd to suppose the contrary; for one of the two took upon him to propose (tho' as his private Thought) that the Allies should content themselves if the King of France would assist them with a certain Sum of Money to help them to conquer Spain and the Indies; they judg'd, that before they declar'd themselves upon that Proposition, 'twas necessary to be thoroughly inform'd of the Intentions of France in so weighty and so essential an Affair: In order to this, they desir'd M. Petkum, who formerly had been employ'd in the Negotiation, and was so ag'n for this End, to talk about it with the Plenipotentiaries of France, and to acquaint them that the high Allies could not accept what had been propos'd touching a Subsidy, because that suppos'd a separate Peace with France, and the Continuance of a War separately against Spain, to which the Allies could not consent for the Reasons alledg'd in the first Conference; requiring at the same time a plain Declaration of the Intentions of France upon the Point of evacuating Spain and the Indies in Favour of King Charles conformably to the Preliminaries, before which the Allies could not explain themselves upon the Proposition of a Partition: And withal, M. Petkum was to declare on the Part of the Allies, that their Intention was, that the Foundation which had been laid, namely the Restitution to them of Spain and the Indies according to the Preliminaries, should remain firm; and that on that Foot the Negotiation might be continued; but if any Offer was made to depart therefrom, the Continuance of the Conferences would be fruitless. The said Plenipotentiaries having not thought fit to answer in any Manner to what M. Petkum represented to them, and having some Days after demanded a new Conference, and the Deputies having intimidated in their Answer to that Demand, that they were ready to explain themselves upon what M. Petkum had propos'd, the said Deputies went again to Gertruydenberg; where the said Plenipotentiaries told them, that tho' they did not think themselves oblig'd to receive a Message by M. Petkum, yet they had sent his Proposition to the Court; but that in their Opinion it had been found there so general and ambiguous, that they had not receiv'd any Order thereupon: Wherefore the said Deputies did so well explain and justify the said Proposition to the said Plenipotentiaries, that they left remaining no Doubt or Ambiguity concerning it; representing to them, that the high Allies could not accept the Proposal of Subsidies for the Recovery of Spain and the Indies; and deducing their Reasons for it, namely, because by the Discourse which pass'd about it in the preceding Conference, they clearly perceiv'd, that no Agreement could ever be made, but that mighty Difficulties would occur, either as to the Sums, or the Security for the Payment of them, or the Security to be given by France not to assist directly or indirectly the Duke of Anjou: [From which it appears, that the Refusal of all Offers of Money of what Nature soever, and what Security soever could be propos'd, is a little too liberally asserted in that Letter.] But the principal and essential Reason why that new Proposition of the said Plenipotentiaries could not be accepted, was, because it suppos'd a separate War with Spain, and that that Kingdom and the Indies were to be conquer'd by the Arms of the Allies; which was contrary to the first Foundation and to the Intention of the high Allies. Further, In Explanation of the remaining Part of the Proposition

of the said M. Petkum, the said Deputies represented, supporting what they advanc'd with good Reasons, that the said Plenipotentiaries having propos'd a Partition, and having reduc'd it to Sicily and Sardinia, the high Allies had always been, and still were perswaded that the true sense of that Proposition was, that in Case they would declare themselves thereupon, the Preliminary Articles would then remain intire, as well the 37th as all the rest, which France had declar'd should subsist before this Negotiation was resum'd; and that by Consequence Spain and the Indies with their Dependances should be restor'd, conformably to the Preliminaries, that is to say, within the Time therein express'd, or within such other Time as should be agreed; and that if the said Restitution were not made accordingly, what was stipulated in the Preliminaries should have Effect, namely, that the Suspension of Arms should cease: That this Point of the Restitution of Spain and the Indies with their Dependances, being the Foundation and the essential Point of the Negotiation, the Allies could not continue in any Uncertainty concerning it, nor be content with Words and Promises, without being sure that they would have Effect: That therefore they conceiv'd a peremptory Declaration, ought to be given them thereupon, before they explain'd themselves touching the Partition propos'd; but when they should be plainly inform'd and satisfi'd with respect to the said essential Point, they would facilitate Means for terminating all the rest and bringing it to a good End: That among the Means proper to be made use of for facilitating the Affair, this might be one; viz. in case the King of France could not persuade his Grandson to quit and yield up Spain and the Indies according to the Preliminaries, but should be oblig'd for that End to use Measures of Compulsion, in that case the Allies would likewise cause their Troops in Spain and Portugal to act for the same Purpose during the Time limited for the Cessation of Arms, or during the further Time that should be agreed; tho' according to the Preliminaries they were not oblig'd thereto, but might discharge their Engagements in those Preliminaries by remaining during such time in Inaction. The Allies having judg'd it necessary to explain themselves by the Deputies thus clearly and precisely, and to demand a like Explanation on the Part of France, the said Plenipotentiaries took upon them (as was propos'd to them,) to write again to Court; and in consequence they have now sent the Answer contain'd in the Letter abovemention'd.

'Tis notorious and incontestable, that before any Negotiation was begun, that while the Preliminaries were treating, that by those Preliminaries themselves, that before this last Negotiation was resum'd, and all the while it lasted, the Restitution of Spain and the Indies has ever been laid down for the firm and immoveable Foundation of the Negotiation, and that there is no Question remaining concerning it; unless only, that the Allies insist on having intire Security given them that this Foundation once laid remain fix'd, and be not overturn'd; and that what has been promis'd them concerning it from the very first and without Difficulty, have its full Effect; or at least that a Security be given them equivalent to what they think they have by the 37th Article of the Preliminaries; this essential Point being of so great Importance, that 'twould be acting against all manner of Prudence and Reason to consent that the smallest Doubt should remain concerning it.

It is also clear and evident, that the High Allies have a Right to demand for the House of Austria the Restitution of Spain and the Indies with their Dependances, not only of the Duke of Anjou as having Possession of them, but principally of the King of France, as the Person who contrary to a Renunciation and solemn Treaties got Possession of them in the Manner universally known, and who by consequence is oblig'd to restore them: Nor can the Impossibility alledg'd exempt him from it; for besides that this Impossibility, which cannot by any Means be taken for granted, has no other Cause than the said King's own Act and Deed, in putting his Grandson into a Condition to maintain himself against his Will in the Possession wherein his said Majesty plac'd him, by which his said Majesty's Obligation to Restitution would not be in any Manner diminish'd, no Man can let himself be easily perswaded that the Grandson of his said Majesty, who out of Spain has no Support or Supply but from his said Majesty, could or durst undertake to keep Possession of Spain and the Indies, if his said Majesty would bona fide and sincerely signify his Will to him on that Subject, and make him feel the Effects of such his Will if need should require, particularly when the high Allies shall concur with him during the Time of the Truce. This is so manifest, that 'tis not to be conceiv'd how otherwise the most Christian King could without making any Difficulty promise the Restitution of Spain and the Indies, even before the first Negotiation was begun, how he could lay it down for the first Foundation upon which all has since been built; or how the Court of France could have any other



Opinion than this, namely, either that his said Majesty very well knew the Will and Intention of his Grandson to give up Spain and the Indies, or that he knew by what Means to compel him to it if it were necessary; for otherwise it would follow, that his said Majesty did from the first design to amuse the high Allies, and to excite them by promising them a thing so essential that he had neither in his Will nor in his Power to effect, which is not to be presum'd, unless one would question of his good Faith; the rather because in a Conference held here last Year with the Ministers of France, one of them said, that perhaps King Philip would be at Versailles before him; a plain Proof, that there was no Manner of Doubt then at the Court of France of a thing which they would now pass upon us for impossible, and that they were thoroughly perswaded that at all Adventures the Matter depended wholly on the Will or on the Power of his Most Christian Majesty.

From all this it undeniably results, that in the last Conference the said Deputies demanded nothing on the Part of the Allies, but what from the first Beginning and in the Progress has constantly been laid down for a Foundation; what they might demand with Justice; what France was able to perform; and consequently that what is alleg'd in this Letter, and so often repeated in it, namely that the Propositions made by the Deputies in the last Conference were newly invented, unjust, and impossible to be executed, is altogether groundless; seeing the Restitution of Spain and the Indies, with their Dependances, except what should be otherwise agreed upon, has been with Reason always demanded from the Beginning to the End, and could not have been propos'd on the Part of France but as a thing possible, and was reputed such and is so still by the Allies.

'Tis very easy to disprove what is alleg'd in divers other parts of this Letter, particularly that the said Deputies did often vary, did contradict themselves in different Propositions, did propose some contrary to the 4th and 5th Articles of the Preliminaries, did retract at one time what they had advanced at another, and several other the like things, which are therein set forth in an odious Manner; for it appears by what is said above, that the said Deputies have always had this Thought, and could have no other than this, viz. that the Proposition of a Partition, on the Part of France, was made in this plain sense and meaning, that if it could once be agreed, all the Difficulties that have hitherto occur'd in the Execution of the Preliminaries, would thereby be remov'd, and at the same time those Difficulties would be prevented which consist in the taking of the Measures mention'd in the 4th Article, which Measures likewise would not subsist if that Article could be separated from the 37th, which it could not if the unexpected Case should happen, that the Duke of Anjou should refuse to quit Spain, and France after having employ'd two Months in vain, should have occasion for the Assistance of the Allies, to make him abandon not only Spain and the Indies, but likewise the whole Monarchy without the least Dissembling.

In the last Conference but one, the said Plenipotentiaries gave Occasion for some Discourse, whether proper Means might not be found to secure to the Allies the Restitution of Spain and the Indies more effectually; but the said Deputies did not therefore depart from their first Sentiment, which was that the Proposal of a Partition had been made to facilitate the said Restitution, and to execute by favour of that Partition the Preliminary Articles in all their Parts. But the Discourse which pass'd on that Subject affording Ground to apprehend that France had a contrary Intention, this gave Occasion for demanding a fair Explanation from that Court, and for declaring plainly in the last Conference the Thought of the Allies on that Subject; yet it cannot therefore be said of those Deputies that they have varied, and have contradicted themselves, and retracted, as they are accus'd, seeing they always kept to the principal Point, namely the Security which the Allies ought to have with respect to the Restitution of Spain and the Indies.

In like Manner, all that is alleg'd of the pretended Variation of the Allies according to the Events of War, and the Facilities of France to expedite the Peace, is destitute of all Foundation, as are also the Instances brought to prove it; for we are not conscious nor is it in any Way acknowledg'd on the Part of the Allies, that the last Year they would have look'd upon it as an Injury to be thought capable of demanding of the King of France that he should unite his Forces with theirs, this having never been alleg'd, neither last Year nor this, in any of the Conferences; and if any thing may have been said elsewhere, no Conclusion can be drawn from it: And certainly, had the Allies been inclin'd to vary according to Events, what has pass'd since the adjusting of the Preliminaries, as the Conquest of the Town and Citadel of Tournay, the Victory of Malplaquet, the Reduction of Mons, the Passage of the Lines near the Scarpe, and the taking of Douay, would afford them Ground sufficient.

As to the said Plenipotentiaries expatiating in several

Places of their said Letter upon the Hardship of the Conditions, which would oblig'd the King their Master to make War singly against his Grandson, and providing that in case the Restitution of Spain and the Indies should not be intirely perform'd within two Months, the Truce should cease, notwithstanding the King of France should have executed all the other Conditions of the Preliminaries; 'tis to be observ'd that what is said in one Place, namely that the King should make War singly against his Grandson, is contradicted in a subsequent Period a little lower, where it is said, that the Troops which the Allies have in Portugal and Catalonia shall act in Conjunction with those of France during the Space of two Months: For altho' it be there added, that this should be only as a Favour, for so 'tis thought fit to style it, to render odious a Concession which the Allies are willing to make, and that after the Expiration of that Term those Troops should cease to act; yet 'tis certain that this would be a no inconsiderable Assistance, for the said Time of two Months, or for such other longer Term as might be agreed; nor could it be thought extraordinary, if those Troops should act no longer, seeing that after the prescribed Term the Truce must expire: Besides, those who would exclaim against the Hardship of obliging the most Christian King singly to procure the Restitution of Spain and the Indies, would do well to reflect what a Hardship it was when his said Majesty possess'd himself singly of all the Spanish Monarchy, and put the rest of Europe in Danger of becoming his Prey likewise. But in reality the thing being duly consider'd, 'twill not be found that there is more Hardship in it, than what is incident to all Contracts or Treaties that stipulate some Restitution, and particularly such as import the Restitution of things which are usually possess'd. In the mean time, it may not unreasonably be presum'd from the Posture the Affairs of Spain are now in, that it would not cost his said Majesty the most Christian King much Trouble, to oblige either by the Way of Persuasion or that of Compulsion, his Grandson to make Restitution of Spain and the Indies, provided his Majesty would go about it sincerely, and that his Grandson and the Spanish Nation were thoroughly perswaded that 'twas the serious Intention and unfeign'd Will of his said Majesty. Besides, there is no more Hardship in this than in all other Conventions and Treaties, because the Truce is to cease upon the Expiration of the Time limited for the Restitution of Spain; for, as the Allies would have Cause to take for an Infraction of the Treaty, if any Towns that might be stipulated to be yielded to them, should not be deliver'd up within the Time prescribed, and to endeavour to procure Satisfaction by Arms, so 'tis more just and reasonable, that if an Article so important as that of the Restitution of Spain and the Indies, should not be executed within the Time stipulated, they should have a Right to resume Arms, to obtain the most essential Point of all that might be agreed; nor could it be deem'd a Hardship, if the Allies, in such a Case, should make use of all their Forces. Further, the high Allies have the more Reason to insist that France procure the Restitution of Spain and the Indies within the time prescribed, because it appears clearly enough by the Discourse of one of the Plenipotentiaries, that should they come even to join their forces to obtain that Restitution, so many Obstacles would be form'd or might be form'd in the Execution, that there would never be an End of it; he having given to understand, that 'twill be necessary first of all to examine and settle, what Number of Land Forces each shall contribute, whether 'twill be best to act jointly or separately, how or where the Troops shall serve, how many Days of War shall be us'd, where shall they be employ'd, who shall command the Land Forces and who the Naval, who shall nominate to those Commands, what Instructions shall be given to those Commanders, who shall draw up those Instructions, and several other such Difficulties, by which 'tis easy to comprehend, that so many might be created that 'twould be an endless Business.

'Tis very frankly affirm'd in the said Letter, that the Court of France, and for them the said Plenipotentiaries, had consented to all that was propos'd to them, and that they never varied, or retracted any thing: But 'tis hard to devise wherein this Facility of theirs consisted; they never so much as consented to declare War against Spain, in Case the Duke of Anjou should refuse to quit it, tho' 'twas propos'd to them, and when they were come into this Country to treat, if an Equivalent for the 37th Article of the Preliminaries, after having first promis'd that they would abide by all the other Articles, they themselves propos'd a Partition to serve for an Equivalent, and reduc'd it to Sicily and Sardinia; and when they are ask'd to declare positively, whether the Preliminaries would then be sign'd and executed, to the End that the Allies might declare themselves upon that Proposal of a Partition, they construe this Demand to be a Design to break off the Conference; which is very far from that Facility which